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Abstract—Multi-stage attacks can evolve dramatically, causing 
much loss and damage to organisations.  These attacks are 
frequently instigated by exploiting actions, which in isolation 
are legal, and are therefore particularly challenging to detect. 
Much research has been conducted in the multi-stage detection 
area, in order to build a framework based on an events 
correlation approach. This paper proposes a framework that 
predicts multi-stage attacks based on a different approach, 
which is an IP information evaluation. This approach was 
chosen after analysing three different multi-stage attack 
scenarios. This paper shows the analysis of those scenarios, 
detailing their steps and information hitherto unexploited in 
current intrusion detection systems. The paper also details the 
results obtained in the evaluation process, including detection 
and false positive rates. 
Keywords-Intrusion detection; Multi-Stage attacks; IP Check; 
Data mining; Fuzzy Logic 
I. Introduction 
Multi-stage attacks have a significant impact on 
organisations. They have been described as the most 
challenging set of attacks to investigate and detect [1].These 
attacks occur through multiple phases to get access to an 
organisation. Most of those attacks involve three phases. In 
the first phase, attackers try to analyse available information 
about the target, to find vulnerabilities and weaknesses that 
can be exploited. In the second phase, attackers exploit the 
weaknesses found in the first phase to inject malware into, or 
to gain access to, the system. In addition, they try to get more 
details and conduct a deep analysis about the system to find 
data or resources in which they have an interest. In the final 
phase, after gaining access, attackers are in a position to 
destroy the system or steal valuable information [2].  
Different solutions have been introduced to detect multi-stage 
attacks, some of those being event correlation-based. Event-
correlation based solutions try to match network events with 
certain attack patterns. When a stream of network events 
matches a certain pattern, attacks can be stopped before 
progressing to the next stages. Many researchers claim the 
effectiveness of that approach in detecting multi-stage attacks. 
However, this approach requires having a-priori knowledge 
of the multi-stage attack pattern (sequences), which is not 
always feasible since discovering new complex attacks 
normally takes some time. The Shady Rat Operation attack is 
a good example of that; it started in 2006 and was only 
discovered in 2011[3].Thus, it has been decided to follow a 
different approach in this research, rather than network events 
correlation when proposing a solution for predicting multi-
stage attacks. The approach is based on evaluating the 
reputation of IP addresses participating in network traffic 
using the fuzzy logic. The fuzzy logic works based on define 
rules to produce an output. Based on specified rules, the fuzzy 
logic decides whether we need to stop the traffic with 
evaluated IP addresses to block potential attacks. 
Section 2 provides a brief background of the fuzzy logic, 
social engineering, and CRLF (carriage return line feed) 
injection. Section 3 provides an analysis of three different 
multi-stage attack scenarios that help in understanding the 
behaviour of multi-stage attacks. The first scenario is about 
communication with a bad DNS server and how that has been 
employed by an attacker to register machines to its bot army. 
The second scenario discusses the Shady Rat attack, which is 
a good example showing how social engineering can be 
employed to target an organisation. The third scenario shows 
how header splitting can be employed by an attacker to target 
a network connected to a web host running a web application. 
Section 4 goes through the proposed solution. Section 5 
discusses the evaluation process detailing the evaluation 
approach and results obtained in different evaluation phases. 
Section 6 goes through some related work. Section 7 provides 
the conclusion and future work of this paper. 
 
II. Brief Background 
A. Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic is a computational approach based on human 
language rules. The fuzzy systems translate the defined rules 
to mathematical equivalents [4]. Those systems, as shown in 
Fig. 1, consist of a fuzzifier, inference engine, rules base, and 
defuzzifier. Fuzzy systems work as follows [4]: 
The fuzzifier converts crisp inputs to a fuzzy set by using 
specified membership functions for each input. 
 Based on the defined rules, the inference engine produces 
a fuzzy output. 
The fuzzy output is converted to a crisp value using the 
membership functions defined for defuzzification.   
Fuzzy logic is suitable for ambiguous scenarios [5] where 
there is no certainty about making decisions. When 
comparing fuzzy logic with machine learning algorithms, it 
has been found that constructing the fuzzy rules for a system 
does not take much effort and time, compared to machine 
learning algorithms. Machine learning algorithms require 
large data sets for training to obtain accurate results. In 
addition, the training time with a large data set is a very time 
consuming process [6]. However, fuzzy logic may not be 
suitable in scenarios where it is difficult to deduce the 
reasoning logic.  
 
Figure 1. Fuzzy logic Components 
It will be shown in section 4 that the logic of detecting 
multi-stage attacks can be simply modelled using ‘if then’ 
rules. Based on the nature of the problem and mentioned 
advantages of fuzzy logic, it will be a suitable choice for 
building the reasoning module in the proposed solution.  
B. Social Engineering  
 Social engineering can play a role in constructing a 
multi-stage attack. It is the art of abusing human 
behaviour in order to violate security without victims 
realising that they have been manipulated [7]. 
C. CRLF Injection 
The CRLF injection, which is also known as HTTP 
Response splitting, is an attack that can be easily constructed. 
However, it is an extremely destructive web attack.  Attackers 
construct this kind of attack by exploiting vulnerable web 
applications that may also allow other types of vulnerabilities, 
such as cross site scripting and cross site forgery. The CRLF 
injection is carried out by injecting a very significant 
sequence of characters into web requests. This sequence 
contains two special characters representing EOL (end of 
line), which is used as a marker for many protocols, including 
such as HTTP and NNTP.  In web applications, headers are 
split based on the position of CRLF in requests. Malicious 
users inject their own CRLF sequence into an HTTP request. 
In the absence of filtering malicious inputs, malicious users 
will be able to control the functionalities of a web application 
function. In the next section, an example of CRLF injections 
will be discussed, showing how CRLF injections can be 
employed by attackers to construct multi-stage attacks [8]. 
 
III. Multi-Stage Attack Scenarios 
A. Scenario A 
This scenario has been analysed by using a trace file that 
contains a capture of real network traffic [9]. The scenario 
gives an example of how attackers can register machines to 
their bot army.  Fig. 2 gives an overview of the sequence of 
the attack. The figure shows that the attacker used the 
compromised host to contact a bad DNS server. The DNS 
server returned an unusual DNS response containing 11 IP 
addresses, while a normal response normally does not return 
more than five IP addresses. The attacker used the 
compromised host to scan IP addresses returned in the DNS 
query response and tried to establish communication with 
them. After a successful 3-handshake with one of the IP 
addresses returned in the response, the attacker sent packets 
that contain commands used by the botnet. 
Some steps in this scenario could be considered to 
predict the occurrence of the attack. Detecting a DNS query 
with a bad DNS server can trigger an alert of malicious 
traffic. In addition, an irregular DNS response can indicate 
unusual behaviour. Moreover, sending packets containing 
commands used by botnet gives a strong indication that the 
traffic is malicious.  
 
 
Figure 2. The Stages of Scenario A 
B. Scenario B 
One of the multi-stage attacks, that is social engineering-
based, is Operation Shady Rat. This attack was categorised by 
MacAfee [10] as an advanced persistent threat. An Operation 
Shady Rat attack involves five steps. In the first step, 
attackers select one or more organisations, then email 
individuals who work at those organisations. The emails sent 
contain information that attracts those individuals. Those 
emails also contain attached files that are relevant to the email 
body. Those files appear to recipients as normal files such as 
Word, Excel, or pdf files, but they are loaded with malicious 
code. For example, employees in a marketing company have 
a high interest in getting new contacts. Therefore, attackers 
may target this group by sending an email attached with an 
Excel file containing a contacts list. In the second stage, 
recipients download the attached files, then open them. At the 
point of opening the file, the malware is installed on the 
victim’s computer, thus compromising their computer. In the 
third stage, the installed malicious program tries to establish a 
connection with a remote site specified in the code. The 
remote site URL does not look suspicious and it looks like a 
link to an image or normal html file, but the returned contents 
from that URL contains some information used by the 
malicious code. That information cannot be seen as being 
suspicious content, as it appears as a part of the html content. 
In addition, that information may be encoded or encrypted, so 
it will be difficult to analyse. For example, html comments 
can be used to embed the information that malware uses 
inside the html content. The comments are visible to end 
users, look absolutely legitimate, and cannot be seen as any 
kind of threat.  The html comments may contain an IP address 
of a remote server or a command in an encrypted or encoded 
format. In the fourth stage, the installed malicious code 
establishes a connection with the IP address obtained in the 
third stage. In the fifth stage, attackers at the remote site 
establish a remote shell and run shell commands targeting the 
compromised machine. Attackers at this point can upload or 
download from the compromised side. Fig. 3 shows the 
sequence of this scenario. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Stages of Scenario B 
All steps of this scenario look legitimate and not 
suspicious. However, checking the reputation of the IP 
addresses involved in the communication traffic between the 
malware code and other servers may give an indication of 
suspicious traffic. 
C. Scenario C 
This scenario is based on exploiting an insecure web 
application. An insecure web application can give a chance 
for attackers to get access to machines. The scenario shows 
how attackers exploit a vulnerable PHP web application to 
make a CRLF injection. The first step in this attack is 
carrying out a web vulnerability scan on a web server. This 
scan gives an attacker information about PHP configurations 
and different URLs, including POST and GET parameters 
sent with them. The attacker then uses that information to 
send an email to a victim containing a CRLF-manipulated 
link. This link looks legitimate, but it contains parameters set 
to values that makes a vulnerable web application open a 
different URL, rather than the specified URL in the code, as 
shown in Fig. 4 [8]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. CRLF Injection on a PHP script 
Consider the PHP script below is saved as 
getfile.php: 
 
 
<?php 
 
$folder = $_GET[‘folder’]; 
$file = $_GET[‘file’]; 
passthru("http://www.site1.com/api?folder=$folder&file=$file"); 
?> 
 
 
If an attacker tries to send an email 
containing a link similar to: 
 
getfile.php?folder=visby&file=gotland%20HTTP/1.0%0D%0AHost
%3A%20www. 
site2.st%0D%0AUser-
Agent%3A%20Ulf/0.00D%0ACookie%3A%20user%3Dulf%0D%0A
%0D%0A 
(should be on one line) 
 
This HTTP query will be sent to 
www.site1.st: 
 
GET /api?folder=visby&file=gotland HTTP/1.0 
Host: www.site2.com 
User-Agent: Ulf/0.0 
Cookie: user=ulf 
 
HTTP/1.0 
Host: www.site1.com 
User-Agent: PHP/4.1.2 
 
 
As you can see, the real headers 
from PHP are sent as well, but the web 
server ignores them, as we send two 
CRLFs before them to indicate that the 
headers are over. 
 
 
The injected URL may point to a file that runs on the 
victim’s machine to push a remote shell for the attacker.  The 
attacker proceeds by getting access to the web server, then 
downloads files or scans the network to find information they 
are interested in, or find targets they want to destroy.  Fig. 5 
shows the steps that occur during this attack. 
This type of attack can be predicted or stopped at different 
points. The first point is checking parameters sent with web 
requests coming to the web server, whether it can cause 
CLFR injections or not. In addition to that, outgoing requests 
from the web server can be checked to see whether they go to 
trusted destinations or not.   
 
Figure 5. The Stages of Scenario C 
 
IV. The Proposed Solution 
A. An overview on the proposed solution 
The proposed solution is based on evaluating the 
reputation of IP addresses participating in the captured 
network traffic. The solution consists mainly of three modules 
as shown in Fig. 6. The first module (Network Sniffer) is 
responsible for monitoring network traffic by reading 
incoming and outgoing traffic (It is implemented using 
tcpdump). This module extracts IP addresses found in 
network packets. The IP information finder is responsible for 
finding information related to the IP addresses. The 
information obtained by the second module includes IP 
geographic information and other information that shows 
whether the IP addresses to be checked are malicious. The 
last one is the reasoning module which is fuzzy logic-based. 
This module receives IP information from the previous 
module then analyses the information based on predefined 
rules to decide whether the checked IP is a potential source of 
malicious traffic or not. 
 
Figure 6. The proposed solution block diagram 
 
B. Network Sniffing Module 
Network traffic is monitored using TcpDump tool. It has 
been decided to choose this tool as it is has distributions over 
many operating systems. In addition, it is a command line 
which simplifies the integration process with other modules. 
Moreover, it can be used with a software such as wireshark to 
obtain a graphical representation. TCP dump reads network 
packets then parsed to extracts IP addresses,  it then   push 
messages in a queue that will be consumed by the next 
module (IP info finder). 
C. IP Information Finder Module 
This module gets information about IP participating 
in the traffic using web services (Neutrinoapi and fraud lab) 
[11, 12]. The information obtained includes IP geographic 
location, whether the IP in a block list, if the IP is an 
anonymous proxy, if the IP is an exit tor node, and the 
average IP rating which has a value between one and three 
(one is a the lowest rate and three is the highest). The 
geographic location will be checked against a predefined list 
of countries known with high volume of malicious traffic (the 
list will be referenced later as the malicious geographic list). 
D. Reasoning Module 
As mentioned earlier, the reasoning module is fuzzy logic 
based. The reasoning module receives its inputs from the 
previous module (IP info finder) and analyse them based on 
defined rules in order to decide whether the IP is malicious or 
not. The four elements of fuzzy logic have been implemented 
as follow: 
1- The Fuzzifier: The membership function selected (is IP 
in the malicious geographic list, is IP an anonymous 
proxy, is IP block listed) is a singleton function, as those 
inputs are Boolean values. The selected membership 
function for IP rating is specified using triangle 
functions, as shown in Fig. 7.  
 
Figure 7: The selected membership function for IP rating 
2- Rule Base: This is the part that contains the logic of 
producing the output. The rule base in this module 
contains four if-then rules as shown in Table1. 
Table I If-then rules used in the reasoning module 
If condition Then statement 
(IP in a block list) Possible malicious traffic 
(IP country in the malicious geographic 
list) AND (IP is an anonymous proxy ) 
Possible malicious traffic 
(IP country in the malicious geographic 
list) AND (IP is a TOR exit node ) 
Possible malicious traffic 
(IP Rating is low) Possible malicious traffic 
 
     The first rule is straightforward, the IP will be 
considered as a malicious one if the IP address is found in 
a block list. Finding an IP in a block list means that the IP 
address has been reported to be used in malicious 
activities. The second and third rules check two 
parameters. One of them is whether an IP is on the 
malicious geographic list or not. It is not practical to 
consider an IP as a malicious one if it is only located in 
one of the countries found in the malicious geographic 
list, as there may be legal traffic from these countries. 
Anonymous proxies and tor are used in a way that enables 
users to protect access to the web anonymously. Attackers 
normally do not need to be in the listed countries, they 
direct their traffic through a proxy or tor located in one of 
those countries. Therefore, getting traffic from 
anonymous proxies or tor-exit nodes located in those 
countries raises an alert of potential malicious traffic. The 
last rule checks the average IP rating. The IP address will 
be considered malicious if the average rating is low.  
3- Defuzzifier: The selected membership function for the 
output is as shown in Fig. 8. The output represents the 
probability of having malicious traffic from the checked 
IP address. If the probability is higher than 0.5, the IP 
will be considered as malicious. Otherwise, it will be 
considered as normal. 
 
Figure 8: The membership function for the ouput 
4- Inference Engine: The inference engine can be 
considered as the heart of reasoning, as it is responsible 
for mapping given inputs to a fuzzy output, using the 
specified rules. The inference engine used in this module 
is Mamdani, which is commonly used in fuzzy logic 
systems [13]. 
 
V. Evaluation 
A. Evaluation Approach 
     The system was evaluated using a metrics based approach 
[14]. The approach looks at intrusion detection systems from 
different angles, and it includes logistics, architectural, and 
performance metrics. The logistic metric evaluates the system 
in terms of maintainability, manageability, and dependency. 
The design metric is used to find how well the system 
performs in terms of resources consumption, integration, and 
speed. The last metric used in this approach is the confusion 
metric (performance metric), which finds how well the 
system does its job (detecting multi-stage attacks) in the form 
of true positive, true negative, false positive, and false 
negative. Each category in the logistic and design metrics will 
have a score between one and three (one is the lowest and 
three is the highest) based on number advantages and 
disadvantages For example, consider evaluating the system 
throughput. The system will score one If it has a low 
throughput while it will score two if it has a high throughput 
but with consuming a lot of hardware resources. On the other 
hand, the system will score three if it has a high throughput 
without consuming a lot of hardware resources. 
B. Logistics Metrics 
Table 2 shows the score for each item in the logistic 
assessment. The score for the distributed management item is 
two, as the system supports it but with some potential issues 
in the buffering area. The score for ease of configuration is 
two as many of its components can be easily installed but the 
configurations is not centralized in one user interface and is 
scattered over different areas. In addition, some components 
require prior knowledge to get installed. The score for ease of 
policy management is also two, as detection rules can be 
easily changed by using the same inputs. The score for 
outsource solution is poor (one), as the system is found to be 
massively dependent on using web services. The score for 
platform requirements is three, as the system supports running 
on different platforms, and its hardware requirements are 
dependent on network volume traffic. 
Table II Logistics metrics 
Item Score 
Distributed Management 2 
Ease of configuration 2 
Ease of policy management 2 
Outsource Solutions 1 
Platform Requirements 3 
C. Design Metrics 
Table 3 shows the score for each item in the design 
assessment. The score for adjustable sensitivity is two, as it 
supports adjusting sensitivity through modifying the fuzzy 
rules but is associated with some difficulties in some 
scenarios. The score of data storage is three, as it does not 
require less than one Megabyte to store fuzzy rules and 
blacklisted countries in a database. The score for multi-sensor 
support is three, as it has the ability to communicate with 
different sensors, other than the one proposed with the 
system. The score for both firewall interaction and incident 
logging/notification is also three, as the system is an open 
source PHP code that can be easily modified. The score for 
packet loss is two, as tcpdump cannot perform well in high 
speed networks. The system throughput on the testing 
environment has not achieved a high rate abut it is acceptable 
(around 10 packets/second), so the score will be two for this 
item. 
Table III Design Metrics 
Item Score 
Adjustable sensitivity 2 
Data Storage 3 
Multi sensor support 3 
Firewall Interaction 3 
Incident Logging and notification 3 
Packet loss 2 
System Throughput 2 
 
D. Performance Metrics 
The performance was first tested using a list of 91,744 IP 
addresses (10.99% Normal, 0.57% anonymous proxy in a 
black listed country, 88.53% block listed IP addresses) [15] to 
ensure that the solution was capable of distinguishing 
between malicious and normal IP addresses. The results 
obtained were as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table IV Confusion Metrics 
Class True Positive False Negative 
Normal 1.00 0.00 
Malicious 0.9984 0.0016 
 
The solution was then tested with four different multi-
stage attack scenarios (SQL attack, Cross site scripting, 
Dictionary attack, and UDP scan) [9] using their trace files. 
The solution was able to predict three of them (SQL attack, 
Dictionary attack, and UDP scan) from the first packet, while 
it failed to detect the cross site scripting scenario as none of 
the IP addresses participating in the traffic was categorised as 
malicious. 
 
VI. Related Work 
A number of research studies have been conducted in the 
multi-stage attacks detection area. One of the studies [16] 
proposes a correlation framework that combines two engines, 
online and offline, and uses two mechanisms, high quality 
knowledge-based and statistical-based correlation. The 
proposed framework achieved a 92% multi-stage detection 
rate and 21.8% false positive rate during their lab 
experiments.  This approach reduces the computation 
expenses by analysing only alerts received by IDS. However, 
the massive dependence on alerts received by IDS may lead 
to missing capturing attacks if alerts are not received.  
Another study [17] proposed a system that follows the 
attack scenario construction approach. This approach is based 
on associating two security incidents, and it tries to find 
consequences of one incident and prerequisites for the 
incident that may occur later. The strong point of this 
approach is the ability to construct new attacks created by a 
mixture of known attacks that can be detected. On the other 
hand, attacks cannot be tracked without finding cause and 
effect of these attacks. Moreover, it requires a large 
consumption of computer resources. 
Another study was based on using Hidden Markov Models 
(HMM) [18].  This study found that the HMM approach 
achieved greater classification accuracy, compared to other 
approaches. However, they reported that the accuracy 
obtained was at the expense of additional computations. 
The proposed solution has an advantage over the 
above-mentioned solutions by not being dependent on 
receiving alerts from IDS. Nor does it require a complex 
computation, or memory resources, compared to them. 
In addition, the previous solutions require an update 
with sequences of new attacks, while the proposed 
solution focuses on the identity. However, this may 
represent an issue, if an attack comes from an IP address 
not classified yet as suspicious. Moreover, the 
throughput of the proposed system is relatively low 
compared to other solutions, due to using web services 
that take some time to get IP information. 
 
VII. Conclusion and Future Work 
The proposed approach in this paper to detecting multi-
stage attacks is based on evaluating IP addresses participating 
in monitored network traffic using fuzzy logic. The solution 
that used this approach was evaluated using a metrics-based 
approach. It has a medium score from the logistics 
perspective. On the other hand, it has a high score when 
looking from the design perspective. The last part of the 
evaluation looks at the system performance, and it was found 
that the system achieved a good performance with zero false 
positive and a high detection rate. However, the solution fails 
to detect multi-stage attacks if IP addresses participating in 
the traffic are not classified as malicious IP addresses. 
It is planned to combine the proposed approach in this 
research with an event correlation-based approach to gain 
advantage of both approaches by looking at both identities 
and traffic content. 
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